Gain of Function
Bioweapon Labs Get More NIH Funding for Deadly ‘Research’
- EcoHealth Alliance collaborated with the Wuhan Institute of Virology for years, collecting coronavirus samples from bats and manipulating it to jump to humans
- The dangerous gain-of-function research was carried out via a grant awarded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
- The grant was cut off in April 2020 as the COVID-19 pandemic gained steam, and U.S. intelligence agencies started to look into whether the coronavirus that started it all escaped from a biological laboratory in Wuhan, China
- In August 2020, however, the NIH pivoted, granting a new $7.5-million grant to EcoHealth Alliance — part of an $82-million award being split among 11 research teams looking into the origins of viruses and how they infect people
- The controversial move means that EcoHealth Alliance’s work will continue, this time targeting Southeast Asia instead of China
“Gain-of-function” studies are, according to the U.S. Department Health and Human Services,1 research that involves increasing the capacity of a pathogen to cause illness. The method is controversial because it can also risk new viruses leaking out of laboratories and into the population.
In the period 2014 to 2018, this type of research was prohibited in the U.S., but in December 2017, American authorities announced that these kinds of studies would again be allowed.2,3
The Story Begins in China
- Time Line of Events
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
An agency of the European Union
The Laboratory
Ling Ming Yan - The Long Interview
Story at-a-glance
- A paper by Dr. Li-Meng Yan — a former researcher at the University of Hong Kong School of Public Health, a top coronavirus research lab — claims to present evidence showing SARS-CoV-2 likely underwent genetic manipulation
- Yan previously accused the Chinese government and World Health Organization representatives in Hong Kong of covering up the Wuhan outbreak
- On the morning of September 14, 2020, Yan posted a link to her paper on Twitter. Shortly thereafter, she posted another tweet saying Zenodo was “immediately hacked” and taken down once the report was posted
- Yan and colleagues propose SARS-CoV-2 was made using the ZC45/ZXC21 bat coronavirus as the backbone. The receptor-binding motif in the spike protein was then manipulated to give the virus the ability to strongly bind to the human ACE2 receptor
- Alina Chan, a molecular biologist at the Broad Institute of Harvard and MIT, is yet another scientist who questions the zoonotic nature of SARS-CoV-2. Since it sprang into action fully evolved for human transmission, Chan believes the missing intermediate phase of evolution took place in a lab
Gain-of-Function Research on HPAI H5N1 Viruses: Welcome and Introductory Remarks
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•Mar 20, 2013
NIHOD
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Gain-of-Function Research on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Viruses:
An International Consultative Workshop
December 17-18, 2012
Decisions about Gain-of-function Research
436 views
•Jan 26, 2015
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Harvey Fineberg, Institute of Medicine, Washington Speech at the Herrenhausen Symposium "Dual Use Research on Microbes: Biosafety, Biosecurity, Responsibility", 10.12.2014 In his talk, Harvey Fineberg describes a recent fundamental shift in US policy on dual use research on microbes. In the summer of 2014 three lapses in biosafety became public and caused the U.S. government to temporarily halt its funding for dual use research on certain kinds of organisms. This decision represents a fundamental shift: In the past, the burden of proof whether research or the publication of research results was too high a risk, lay with the regulating body, i.e. mainly the government. The halting of funding turned this around. Now the researchers and the research institutions have the burden of proof to show that the benefits of going forward with their research outweigh the risks. In his talk, Fineberg lays out the challenges to reaching informed, sensible, acceptable, and appropriate solutions. He emphasizes that the words in which we frame the problems already influence the issues we raise and the answers we might give. Fineberg describes what a discussion about this kind of risk-benefit analysis could look like and who needs to be involved. Fineberg served two consecutive terms as President of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences in the USA (2002-2014). He served as Provost of Harvard University from 1997 to 2001, following thirteen years as Dean of the Harvard School of Public Health. His past research has focused on the process of policy development and implementation, assessment of medical technology, evaluation and use of vaccines, and dissemination of medical innovations. Dr. Fineberg helped found and served as president of the Society for Medical Decision Making and has been a consultant to the World Health Organization.
